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Abstract
It is well known that sequential decision making may lead to information cascades. That is,
when agents make decisions based on their private information, as well as observing the actions
of those before them, then it might be rational to ignore their private signal and imitate the
action of previous individuals. If the individuals are choosing between a right and a wrong state,
and the initial actions are wrong, then the whole cascade will be wrong. This issue is due to
the fact that cascades can be based on very little information.
We show that if agents occasionally disregard the actions of others and base their action
only on their private information, then wrong cascades can be avoided. Moreover, we study the
optimal asymptotic rate at which the error probability at time t can go to zero. The optimal
policy is for the player at time t to follow their private information with probability pt = c/t,
leading to a learning rate of c′/t, where the constants c and c′ are explicit.
1 Introduction
Many everyday situations involve sequential decision making, where one makes a decision based on
some private information and the previous actions of others. Consider, for example, the following
classroom experiment (see [9, Chapter 16]). An experimenter puts an urn containing three balls at
the front of the room. This urn is either majority blue, containing two blue balls and one yellow ball,
or majority yellow, containing two yellow balls and one blue ball; both urns are equally likely to be
chosen. The students then come to the front of the room one by one. Each student draws a ball
at random from the urn and puts it back without showing it to the rest of the class. The student
then has to guess the majority color of the urn, announcing her guess publicly. Each student thus
makes their decision based on their draw and the announcements of those gone before them.
Let us consider how such an experiment proceeds. The first student only has her own draw to
go by, so she will announce the drawn color as her best guess of the majority color. The second
student knows this, so together with her own draw she has two independent draws as information.
If the colors of the two agree, then the second student announces this color. If the colors of the
two draws differ, then she has to use a tie-breaking rule—let us assume that she breaks ties by
following her own draw. With this choice we see that the second student also announces the color
of the ball she drew. Hence the third student has three independent draws as information and her
best guess for the majority color of the urn will be the majority color among the three draws.
Notice that if the first two announced colors were blue, then the third student announces blue
regardless of the color of her draw. The fourth student knows this and hence the announcement of
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the third student has no information value. The fourth student is thus in the same situation as the
third one and will also just announce blue following the first two students. Following the same logic,
all subsequent students will announce blue, regardless of the color of their draw. This phenomenon
is known as herding or as an information cascade. Its study was originated by Banerjee [4] and by
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [6], independently and concurrently; we refer to Easley and
Kleinberg [9, Chapter 16] for an exposition.
The main issue with information cascades is that they can be wrong. For instance, it might
be that the urn is majority yellow, but the first two students draw a blue ball and announce blue,
and hence everyone announces blue as their guess. The main cause of this is that information
cascades can be based on very little information: the actions of a few initial actors can determine
all subsequent actions. This also explains why information cascades are fragile: if additional
information is revealed (e.g., someone reveals not only their action but also their private signal)
or if some people deviate from rational behavior, then wrong information cascades can be broken.
The focus of this paper is to analyze the fragility of information cascades quantitatively.
To this end, we study a variant of the simple model of sequential decision making studied
previously, where not all agents are Bayesian: some are “revealers”, who disregard the actions of
others and act solely based on their private signal. This is motivated by both empirical results from
laboratory experiments on human behavior in such a setting [3], as well as theoretical considera-
tions [5]; see Section 1.3 for further discussion of related work. We assume that the player at time
t is a revealer with probability pt, independently of everything else, and is a Bayesian otherwise.
While agents do not know whether those before them were Bayesians or revealers, this process still
introduces additional information that can be useful for making inferences. Are wrong information
cascades broken in such a model? That is, do people eventually learn the “correct” action?
We show that the answer is yes: there exist revealing probabilities {pt}
∞
t=1 such that learning
occurs. Moreover, we study the optimal asymptotic rate at which the error probability at time t
can go to zero. We show that the optimal policy is for the player at time t to follow their private
information with probability pt = c/t, leading to a learning rate of c
′/t, where the constants c and
c′ are explicit.
1.1 Model and main result
We describe the simplest case of the model first, in order to focus on the conceptual points; we
discuss generalizations at the end of the paper. The state of the world is θ ∈ {1, 2}, chosen uniformly
at random, that is, P (θ = 1) = P (θ = 2) = 1/2. At times t = 1, 2, 3, . . . players try to guess the
state of the world, based on their private information, as well as observing the actions (guesses) of
those before them.
The private signals are drawn in the following way. There is an urn that contains two types of
balls: type 1 balls are blue and type 2 balls are yellow. Given θ, there are a balls of type θ in the
urn and b balls of the other type, where we assume that a > b > 0. Each player draws a single
ball (with replacement) from the urn, its color is their private signal. In other words, the private
signals X1,X2, . . . are i.i.d. with the following distribution:
P (X1 = 1 | θ = 1) =
a
a+ b
, P (X1 = 2 | θ = 1) =
b
a+ b
,
P (X1 = 1 | θ = 2) =
b
a+ b
, P (X1 = 2 | θ = 2) =
a
a+ b
.
The goal of the players is to guess the majority color (type) of the balls in the urn. We denote the
actions (guesses) of the players by Z1, Z2, . . . . We assume that each player is one of two kinds:
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• a Bayesian, whose guess is the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate1; or
• a revealer, whose guess is their private signal.
We assume that player t is a revealer with probability pt, independently of everything else. Formally,
let I1, I2, . . . be independent Bernoulli random variables (and also independent of everything else)
such that E [It] = pt. If It = 0, then player t is a Bayesian and hence Zt = MAP(Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt),
while if It = 1, then player t is a revealer and hence Zt = Xt. Note that players do not know
whether the players before them are Bayesians or revealers. We do assume, however, that the
players know the probabilities {pt}
∞
t=1.
The players aim to learn the majority color/type of the urn, that is, to learn θ, and also to
minimize the probability of an incorrect guess. Denote by
Et := P (Zt 6= θ)
the probability that the guess of player t is incorrect. We aim to understand the optimal asymptotic
rate at which the error probability Et can go to zero; the following theorem is our main result.
Theorem 1.1. Consider the model described above and let
κ⋆ ≡ κ⋆ (a, b) :=
1
1 + a/b−1log a/b
(
log
(
a/b−1
log a/b
)
− 1
) . (1.1)
We have that
inf
{pt}
∞
t=1
lim sup
t→∞
tEt = κ⋆ (a, b) . (1.2)
That is, the optimal rate of learning is 1/t, and we obtain the specific constant as well in (1.1).
As we shall see, one can get arbitrarily close to the optimum by taking
pt = (1 + ε)
a+ b
b
·
κ⋆ (a, b)
t
∧ 1 (1.3)
for t ≥ 1, where ε > 0 is arbitrary (and where we use the standard notation x ∧ y := min {x, y}).
1.2 Heuristic explanation of the optimal rate of learning
We now provide intuition for why 1/t is the optimal order for the rate of learning, as well as the
reasons behind the constant in (1.1). First, note that the probability that player t is a revealer and
draws a ball of the minority color is ba+bpt. When this occurs, player t guesses incorrectly, implying
that Et ≥
b
a+bpt. So in order for the error probability Et to go to zero, pt must go to zero as t→∞.
On the other hand, pt cannot go to zero too quickly. If
∑∞
t=1 pt <∞, then by the Borel-Cantelli
lemma there will be only finitely many revealers almost surely. This leads to a situation similar to
when there are no revealers: if a correct cascade has not started before the last revealer, then there
is a constant probability of ending up in a wrong cascade.
In fact, pt should decay as 1/t to achieve the optimal rate of learning. To see a lower bound
of this order, let pt = δ/t for δ small. By a Chernoff bound, with high probability there will be at
most 2δ log t revealers among the first t players. If the first two players and all revealers until time
t draw balls of the minority color, then so will every player until time t. This event has probability
at least c (b/(a+ b))2δ log t for some constant c, which is greater than t−ε if δ > 0 is small enough.
1We assume that if the posteriors are equal, then a Bayesian follows their private signal.
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To see an upper bound, we now argue that if pt = C/t with C large enough, then the probability
that a wrong cascade (among Bayesians) lasts until time t is o(1/t). Indeed, in such a cascade some
of the revealers will be visible—precisely those that deviate from the cascade consensus. The player
at time k has probability aa+bpk to be a revealer who draws the majority color, and probability
b
a+bpk to be a revealer who draws the minority color. Hence in a wrong cascade there will be, in
expectation, aa+bC log t deviations from the cascade consensus by time t, while in a right cascade
the expected number of deviations is only ba+bC log t. The total number of deviations by time t
will roughly be Poisson distributed. The probability that a Poi (λ) random variable is larger by a
constant factor than its mean is exponentially small in λ and here λ is on the order of log t. Hence
by taking C large this exponential in C log t will be o(1/t).
In fact, the heuristics of the previous paragraph give the right constant as well. To distin-
guish between right and wrong cascades we need to distinguish between Poi
(
a
a+bC log t
)
and
Poi
(
b
a+bC log t
)
random variables. The total variation distance between them satisfies
1− TV
(
Poi
(
a
a+bC log t
)
,Poi
(
b
a+bC log t
))
= t−(1+o(1))f(a,b,C) (1.4)
for some (explicit) function f (a, b, C). The right hand side of (1.4) is roughly the error probability
if player t is a Bayesian. This term should be balanced with the term ba+bpt =
bC
a+b ·
1
t coming from
player t being a revealer and drawing a ball of the minority color. This balancing requires choosing
C = C(a, b) such that f (a, b, C) = 1, which occurs when C = a+bb κ⋆ (a, b), just as in (1.3).
1.3 Related work
The special case of the model described in the previous subsection where every agent is Bayesian
(i.e., with pt = 0 for every t ≥ 1) is identical to the model described in the exposition of Easley and
Kleinberg [9, Chapter 16]. The original model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [6] differs
only in its tie-breaking rule (breaking ties by flipping a fair coin), while that of Banerjee [4] differs
in the signal distribution (false signals are drawn from a continuous distribution). Despite these
minor differences, these models all share the same phenomenological behavior as described in the
introductory paragraphs.
In particular, Bikhchandani et al. [6] emphasize the fragility of information cascades with re-
spect to different types of shocks, as prior work on conforming behavior could not explain this
phenomenon. They show examples from numerous fields (e.g., politics, zoology, medicine, and
finance) where cascades occur and are fragile. The current paper can be viewed as a more detailed
quantitative exploration of the fragility of cascades. What amount of additional information is
needed to break wrong cascades? What is the optimal rate of learning that can be achieved?
One possible source of additional information comes from people not acting in a rational,
Bayesian manner. It is well documented that human behavior is often irrational (see, e.g., [14]). In
the information cascades setting, laboratory experiments by Anderson and Holt [3] show that while
most participants act rationally, many do not. When deviations from rational behavior occur, par-
ticipants often act mainly or solely based on their private information, disregarding the information
in the actions of those before them.2 Such individuals effectively reveal their private signal, which
is valuable information for those coming after them. The model described in Section 1.1, which
contains Bayesians and revealers, captures this empirically observed behavioral phenomenon.
2See also related experiments and results by C¸elen and Kariv [7] for a setting with continuous signals.
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A closely related model was introduced and studied by Bernardo and Welch [5]. This model
also contains two types of individuals: (1) rational ones and (2) overconfident ones, termed “en-
trepreneurs”, who put more weight on their private signal than a rational individual would. As the
authors mention in their paper, their motivation was not to show that information cascades can
be broken by overconfident behavior, but rather to offer a simple explanation for the existence of
overconfident individuals based on group selection principles. Nevertheless, since here our focus is
on breaking wrong information cascades, we compare our work with theirs in this regard.
In [5] the overconfidence of entrepreneurs is termed “modest” if they still put positive weight
on the information from individuals before them, and it is termed “extreme” if they act solely
based on their private signal. If the overconfidence of entrepreneurs is modest, then still a wrong
cascade occurs with positive probability, bounded away from zero, which is undesirable. Only if
the overconfidence of entrepreneurs is extreme—as in the model in Section 1.1—can learning occur
eventually with probability one. Bernardo and Welch study their model via simulations which, in
the extreme overconfidence setting, suggest that a vanishing fraction of entrepreneurs is optimal.
Our work is a rigorous and much more detailed study of this model3; in particular, our results
imply that the optimal number of entrepreneurs is logarithmic in the size of the group.
The recent work of Cheng, Hann-Caruthers, and Tamuz [8] also considers sequential learning
models with non-Bayesian agents and shows that wrong cascades can be avoided if there are some
non-Bayesian agents. However, they assume (like in [5]) that each agent knows which of the
previous agents were revealers, an assumption that we do not make. More importantly, the main
contribution of the current paper is the explicit characterization of the optimal rate of learning.
Another possible source of additional information is using the first few agents as “guinea pigs”,
that is, forcing them to follow their private signals; see the work of Sgroi [20]. Le, Subramanian,
and Berry [16] point out that this is related to the multi-armed bandit literature, with guinea pigs
corresponding to agents used for exploring [15, 2]. They also mention that it follows from this
literature that the optimal number of guinea pigs is logarithmic in the number of agents [2]; this is
consistent with our results, albeit in a slightly different setting.
The framework for sequential decision making described in this paper assumes finite discrete
private signals. If the informativeness of private signals is unbounded (e.g., Gaussian signals),
then wrong cascades do not form and asymptotic learning occurs [21]. In such settings the main
question concerns the speed of asymptotic learning, see, for instance, the work of Hann-Caruthers,
Martynov, and Tamuz [12].
The framework of this paper also fits into the broader field of social learning. In particular,
there is a large literature on learning in social networks. Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar [1]
consider a model of sequential decision making where agents act only once, but each agent can only
observe a subset of previous actions, based on a stochastic social network. One of their results
is that asymptotic learning occurs even if private signals have bounded informativeness if there
are sufficiently many individuals whose neighborhoods are non-persuasive and hence whose action
will necessarily be influenced by their private signal. Similar to revealers in the model described
in Section 1.1, these individuals provide a sufficient amount of information for those coming after
them to lead to asymptotic learning.
Another typical setting that is studied involves agents who take repeated actions based on
their private signal, as well as observing the actions of their neighbors in the network. The main
questions include whether or not all agents learn the correct action eventually, what is the speed of
learning if it occurs, and how do these depend on the network topology. We highlight recent work
3We note that there are small differences in the model studied here and the model of Bernardo and Welch [5]; for
instance, in [5] it is assumed that the identities of entrepreneurs are known whereas we do not make this assumption.
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of Harel, Mossel, Strack, and Tamuz [13], which is similar in spirit to the current paper in that
it provides a detailed study of the asymptotic rates of social learning in a mean field setting. A
complete overview of the literature is beyond the scope of this article; we refer the reader to the two
papers above, as well as to the works of Gale and Kariv [11], Mossel, Sly, and Tamuz [17, 18, 19],
and the references therein for more.
2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
The action of player t can be wrong in two ways: (i) if they act as a Bayesian and the MAP
estimator is incorrect, or (ii) if they act on only their private signal and their draw from the urn
is the minority type/color. Hence, conditioning on the coin flip deciding whether player t is a
Bayesian or a revealer, we obtain that
Et = P (Zt 6= θ | It = 0) (1− pt) + P (Zt 6= θ | It = 1) pt.
Now recall that given It = 1, we have Zt = Xt, and so
P (Zt 6= θ | It = 1) = P (Xt 6= θ) =
b
a+ b
.
Recall also that given It = 0, we have Zt = MAP(Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt). Thus
Et = P (MAP (Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt) 6= θ) (1− pt) +
b
a+ b
pt. (2.1)
So we need to understand the probability that the MAP estimator is incorrect at time t. We
summarize the behavior of the MAP estimator in Lemma 2.1 and then prove Theorem 1.1 using this,
before turning to the proof of the lemma. In the statement of the lemma and throughout the paper
we use standard asymptotic notation; for instance f(t) = o(g(t)) as t→∞ if limt→∞ f(t)/g(t) = 0
and f(t) = ω(g(t)) as t→∞ if limt→∞ f(t)/g(t) =∞.
Lemma 2.1. Consider the setting of Theorem 1.1 and fix ε > 0.
(a) Suppose that
pt = (1 + ε)
a+ b
b
·
κ⋆ (a, b)
t
∧ 1 (2.2)
for every t ≥ 1. Then
P (MAP (Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt) 6= θ) = o
(
1
t
)
as t→∞. (2.3)
(b) Suppose that
lim sup
t→∞
tpt ≤ (1− ε)
a+ b
b
κ⋆ (a, b) . (2.4)
Then
P (MAP (Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt) 6= θ) = ω
(
1
t
)
as t→∞. (2.5)
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Choose {pt}
∞
t=1 as in (2.2). Lemma 2.1 says that then (2.3) holds, and hence
by (2.1) we have that Et = (1 + o (1)) (1 + ε) κ⋆ (a, b) /t as t→∞. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we have
that
inf
{pt}
∞
t=1
lim sup
t→∞
tEt ≤ κ⋆ (a, b) . (2.6)
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To show that this is optimal, first note that Et ≥
b
a+bpt. Hence, if
lim sup
t→∞
tEt < κ⋆ (a, b) , (2.7)
then the corresponding sequence of probabilities {pt}
∞
t=1 must satisfy (2.4) for some ε > 0. But
then Lemma 2.1 says that P (MAP (Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt) 6= θ) = ω (1/t). So by (2.1) we have that
Et = ω (1/t), which contradicts (2.7). Thus the inequality in (2.6) is, in fact, an equality.
The rest of this section consists of the proof of Lemma 2.1. We start in Section 2.1 by introducing
notation and making basic observations about the MAP estimator that are useful for both bounds
in Lemma 2.1. Then we turn to the proof of Lemma 2.1 (a) in Section 2.2 and we conclude with
the proof of Lemma 2.1 (b) in Section 2.3.
2.1 The MAP estimator
In this subsection we introduce some notation and make basic observations about the MAP esti-
mator that are useful for the bounds in Lemma 2.1, which is proven subsequently.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Pi denote the probability measure conditioned on θ = i, that is, Pi (·) :=
P (· | θ = i). Similarly, Ei denotes expectation conditioned on θ = i. For i ∈ {1, 2} and t ≥ 1, denote
by P ti the distribution of (Z1, . . . , Zt). That is, for (z1, . . . , zt) ∈ {1, 2}
t, let
P ti (z1, . . . , zt) := Pi (Z1 = z1, . . . , Zt = zt) .
Similarly, for i ∈ {1, 2} and t ≥ 1, denote by Qti the distribution of (Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt). Define also
the corresponding likelihoods:
Lti := P
t
i (Z1, . . . , Zt) ,
Dti := Q
t
i (Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt) ,
with D0i = L
0
i = 1 for i ∈ {1, 2}. An outside observer who records the actions of the first t players
can compute the likelihoods Lt1 and L
t
2, while player t can compute the likelihoods D
t
1 and D
t
2. If
player t is a Bayesian, then their guess is based on the likelihoods Dt1 and D
t
2. Specifically, since
the prior on θ is uniform, we have that
MAP (Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt) =

1, if Dt1 > D
t
2,
2, if Dt1 < D
t
2,
Xt, if D
t
1 = D
t
2,
(2.8)
where the last line is due to the tie-breaking rule; recall that if the posteriors are equal then a
Bayesian follows their private signal.
For i ∈ {1, 2} and x ∈ {1, 2}, define
ϕi (x) :=
a
a+ b
1{x=i} +
b
a+ b
1{x 6=i},
and note that, since Xt is independent of everything else, we have that D
t
i = L
t−1
i ϕi (Xt) for
i ∈ {1, 2} and t ≥ 1. Thus in order to understand the likelihoods Dt1 and D
t
2, we need to analyze
Lt1 and L
t
2. Define the L-likelihood and the D-likelihood ratios as
Rt :=
Lt1
Lt2
and R′t :=
Dt1
Dt2
,
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respectively. We can write
R′t = Rt−1
ϕ1 (Xt)
ϕ2 (Xt)
(2.9)
and hence we can determine the action of player t for given Rt−1 and Xt. Note that the random
variable ϕ1 (Xt) /ϕ2 (Xt) takes values in {b/a, a/b}, and hence we have the following three cases.
• If Rt−1 < b/a, then R
′
t < 1 and hence D
t
1 < D
t
2, regardless of the value of Xt. Hence Zt = 1
if player t is a revealer and Xt = 1, and Zt = 2 otherwise.
• If Rt−1 ∈ [b/a, a/b], then Zt = Xt. This can be checked by considering both cases. If Xt = 1
then ϕ1 (Xt) /ϕ2 (Xt) = a/b. Therefore by (2.9) we have that R
′
t ≥ 1 and hence D
t
1 ≥ D
t
2. If
Dt1 > D
t
2 then Zt = 1 = Xt by the definition of the MAP estimator, while if D
t
1 = D
t
2 then
Zt = Xt by the tie-breaking rule. The case of Xt = 2 is analogous.
• If Rt−1 > a/b, then R
′
t > 1 and hence D
t
1 > D
t
2, regardless of the value of Xt. Hence Zt = 2
if player t is a revealer and Xt = 2, and Zt = 1 otherwise.
The three cases above describe how the action of a player depends on their private signal and on
the actions of those who acted before them. This allows us to analyze how the L-likelihood ratio
Rt evolves.
The probability that the MAP estimator makes an error at time t can be expressed using the
D-likelihood ratio as follows. To abbreviate the notation for vectors, we write zt1 ≡ (z1, . . . , zt).
First, conditioning on the value of θ we obtain that
P
(
MAP
(
Zt−11 ,Xt
)
6= θ
)
=
1
2
P1
(
MAP
(
Zt−11 ,Xt
)
= 2
)
+
1
2
P2
(
MAP
(
Zt−11 ,Xt
)
= 1
)
. (2.10)
The two terms on the right hand side of (2.10) are equal due to symmetry, so
P
(
MAP
(
Zt−11 ,Xt
)
6= θ
)
= P1
(
MAP
(
Zt−11 ,Xt
)
= 2
)
. (2.11)
Using (2.8) we obtain the following upper and lower bounds:
P1
(
R′t < 1
)
≤ P
(
MAP
(
Zt−11 ,Xt
)
6= θ
)
≤ P1
(
R′t ≤ 1
)
.
It is more convenient to work with the L-likelihood ratio, so using the fact that baRt−1 ≤ R
′
t ≤
a
bRt−1
we obtain that
P1
(
Rt−1 <
b
a
)
≤ P
(
MAP
(
Zt−11 ,Xt
)
6= θ
)
≤ P1
(
Rt−1 ≤
a
b
)
. (2.12)
To obtain parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 2.1 we bound from above and below the probabilities
appearing in (2.12).
2.2 An upper bound
Proof of Lemma 2.1 (a). By (2.12) our goal is to show that
P1
(
Rt ≤
a
b
)
= o
(
1
t
)
(2.13)
as t→∞, and recall that we assume that the revealing probabilities {pt}
∞
t=1 are as in (2.2).
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Let {Ft}t≥0 denote the filtration defined by the random variables {Zt}t≥1. Observe that, given
θ = 1, the inverse of the L-likelihood ratio, {1/Rt}t≥0, is a martingale with respect to {Ft}t≥0. In
particular, this implies that E1
[
R−1t
]
= 1. Since x 7→ xλ is a concave function for x ∈ (0,∞) when
λ ∈ [0, 1], we have that, given θ = 1, the sequence
{
R−λt
}
t≥0
is a supermartingale with respect to
{Ft}t≥0. Thus E1
[
R−λt
∣∣∣Ft−1] ≤ R−λt−1. We now compute the conditional expectation explicitly:
E1
[
R−λt
∣∣∣Ft−1] = R−λt−1 ∑
i∈{1,2}
P1 (Zt = i | Ft−1)
(
P1 (Zt = i | Ft−1)
P2 (Zt = i | Ft−1)
)−λ
= R−λt−1
∑
i∈{1,2}
P1 (Zt = i | Ft−1)
1−λ
P2 (Zt = i | Ft−1)
λ . (2.14)
The values of the conditional probabilities in (2.14) depend on the value of Rt−1. As described
previously, we have three cases:
P1 (Zt = 1 | Ft−1) =

a
a+bpt if Rt−1 <
b
a ,
a
a+b if Rt−1 ∈
[
b
a ,
a
b
]
,
1− ba+bpt if Rt−1 >
a
b ,
(2.15)
and also
P2 (Zt = 1 | Ft−1) =

b
a+bpt if Rt−1 <
b
a ,
b
a+b if Rt−1 ∈
[
b
a ,
a
b
]
,
1− aa+bpt if Rt−1 >
a
b .
(2.16)
Plugging these back into (2.14) we obtain the conditional expectation in the three cases:
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ ∣∣∣∣∣Rt−1 < ba
]
=
a1−λbλ
a+ b
pt +
(
1−
a
a+ b
pt
)1−λ(
1−
b
a+ b
pt
)λ
, (2.17)
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ ∣∣∣∣∣Rt−1 ∈
[
b
a
,
a
b
]]
=
a1−λbλ + aλb1−λ
a+ b
, (2.18)
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ ∣∣∣∣∣Rt−1 > ab
]
=
aλb1−λ
a+ b
pt +
(
1−
b
a+ b
pt
)1−λ(
1−
a
a+ b
pt
)λ
. (2.19)
The right hand side of (2.18) is strictly less than 1, while the right hand sides of (2.17) and (2.19)
converge to 1 as t → ∞. To estimate the quantities in (2.17) and (2.19), note that (1− δ)λ =
1− λδ +Θ
(
δ2
)
as δ → 0. Defining
fλ ≡ fλ (a, b) :=
λa+ (1− λ) b− aλb1−λ
a+ b
,
we have from (2.17) — (2.19) that
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ ∣∣∣∣∣Rt−1 < ba
]
= 1− f1−λ (a, b) pt +O
(
p2t
)
, (2.20)
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ ∣∣∣∣∣Rt−1 ∈
[
b
a
,
a
b
]]
= 1− (fλ(a, b) + f1−λ(a, b)) (2.21)
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ ∣∣∣∣∣Rt−1 > ab
]
= 1− fλ (a, b) pt +O
(
p2t
)
, (2.22)
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as t → ∞. On the interval λ ∈ [0, 1] the function λ 7→ fλ is concave and nonnegative with
f0 = f1 = 0, it attains its maximum at
λ⋆ ≡ λ⋆ (a, b) :=
log
(
a/b−1
log a/b
)
log a/b
,
and its maximum value is
fλ⋆ (a, b) =
b
a+ b
·
1
κ⋆ (a, b)
, (2.23)
where recall the definition of κ⋆ from (1.1). Note also that λ⋆ ∈ (1/2, 1), due to the fact that a > b.
We group the cases of (2.20) and (2.21) together, but treat them separately from the case
of (2.22), which leads to defining the following random sets:
At :=
{
i ∈ [t] : Ri−1 >
a
b
}
, Bt :=
{
i ∈ [t] : Ri−1 ≤
a
b
}
.
In words, the set At is the set of time indices when the MAP estimator is equal to 1 regardless of
the private signal at this time. Define also
R
(1)
t :=
∏
i∈At
Ri
Ri−1
, R
(2)
t :=
∏
i∈Bt
Ri
Ri−1
,
and note that Rt = R
(1)
t R
(2)
t , since {At, Bt} is a partition of [t]. By (2.22), we have that there
exists C = C (a, b) such that for any λ ∈ [0, 1] we have that
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ
efλpt
∣∣∣∣∣Rt−1, t ∈ At
]
≤ eCp
2
t . (2.24)
Similarly, by (2.20), together with the fact that the right hand side of (2.20) is greater than the
right hand side of (2.21) for all t large enough, we have that there exists C ′ = C ′ (a, b) such that
for any λ ∈ [0, 1] we have that
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ
ef1−λpt
∣∣∣∣∣Rt−1, t ∈ Bt
]
≤ eC
′p2t . (2.25)
Let Mt :=
∑t
i=1 pi, and note that by the choice of {pt}
∞
t=1, together with (2.23), we have that
Mt = (1 + o (1)) (1 + ε)
a+ b
b
κ⋆ (a, b) log t = (1 + o (1))
(1 + ε)
fλ⋆ (a, b)
log t (2.26)
as t → ∞. Define also the random variable Γt :=
∑
i∈At
pi. Putting together (2.24) and (2.25), it
follows by induction that there exists C = C (a, b) such that for any λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1] we have that
E1
[(
R
(1)
t
)−λ1
efλ1Γt
(
R
(2)
t
)−λ2
ef1−λ2 (Mt−Γt)
]
≤ exp
(
C
t∑
i=1
p2i
)
. (2.27)
Since
∑∞
i=1 p
2
i < ∞, the expectation in (2.27) is bounded above by a constant independent of t.
That is, there exists C0 = C0 (a, b) <∞ such that
E1
[(
R
(1)
t
)−λ1
efλ1Γt
(
R
(2)
t
)−λ2
ef1−λ2 (Mt−Γt)
]
≤ C0. (2.28)
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Next, we claim that Rt ≤
a
b implies that
R
(1)
t ≤ 1, (2.29)
and furthermore that there exists a constant C1 <∞ such that
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ t
−C1
)
≤ t−2. (2.30)
We defer the proofs of both of these claims to Appendix A.
From (2.29) we get the following bound on the probability of interest:
P1
(
Rt ≤
a
b
)
≤ P1
(
Rt ≤
a
b
, t−C1 ≤ R
(1)
t ≤ 1
)
+ P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ t
−C1
)
. (2.31)
By (2.30) the second term is at most t−2, so in order to show (2.13) it suffices to bound from
above the first term in the display above. We can break the event
{
Rt ≤
a
b , t
−C1 ≤ R
(1)
t ≤ 1
}
into
subevents based on the value of R
(1)
t . Recall that Rt = R
(1)
t R
(2)
t , so if R
(1)
t ∈
[
e−(x+1), e−x
]
and
Rt ≤
a
b , then R
(2)
t ≤
a
b e
x+1. Letting C3 := 1 + log
a
b we obtain the bound
P1
(
Rt ≤
a
b
, t−C1 ≤ R
(1)
t ≤ 1
)
≤
C1 log t∑
x=0
P1
(
R
(1)
t ∈
[
e−(x+1), e−x
]
, R
(2)
t ≤ e
x+C3
)
≤
C1 log t∑
x=0
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x, R
(2)
t ≤ e
x+C3
)
. (2.32)
We estimate each term in this sum. First, we can rewrite this probability as follows:
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x, R
(2)
t ≤ e
x+C3
)
= P1
((
R
(1)
t
)−λ⋆
≥ eλ⋆x,
(
R
(2)
t
)−(1−λ⋆)
≥ e−(1−λ⋆)(x+C3)
)
= P1
((
R
(1)
t
)−λ⋆
efλ⋆Γt ≥ eλ⋆x+fλ⋆Γt ,
(
R
(2)
t
)−(1−λ⋆)
efλ⋆(Mt−Γt) ≥ e−(1−λ⋆)(x+C3)+fλ⋆(Mt−Γt)
)
.
If both inequalities hold in the display above, then also the product of the expressions on the left
hand sides is greater than or equal to the product of the expressions on the right hand sides. We
thus obtain the following bound:
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x, R
(2)
t ≤ e
x+C3
)
≤ P1
((
R
(1)
t
)−λ⋆
efλ⋆Γt
(
R
(2)
t
)−(1−λ⋆)
efλ⋆(Mt−Γt) ≥ e(2λ⋆−1)x+fλ⋆Mt−(1−λ⋆)C3
)
.
Using Markov’s inequality, together with (2.28) with λ1 = λ⋆ and λ2 = 1− λ⋆, we obtain that
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x, R
(2)
t ≤ e
x+C3
)
≤ C0e
(1−λ⋆)C3 exp {− (2λ⋆ − 1)x− fλ⋆Mt}
≤ C0e
(1−λ⋆)C3 exp {−fλ⋆Mt} , (2.33)
where the second inequality follows from the facts that x ≥ 0 and λ⋆ > 1/2. Recalling from (2.26)
that fλ⋆Mt = (1 + o (1)) (1 + ε) log t, and using (2.32) and (2.33), we arrive at the following bound:
P1
(
Rt ≤
a
b
, t−C1 ≤ R
(1)
t ≤ 1
)
≤
C4 log t
t(1+o(1))(1+ε)
for some constant C4 <∞. Putting this together with (2.31) and (2.30) we obtain (2.13).
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2.3 A lower bound
Proof of Lemma 2.1 (b). By (2.12) our goal is to show that
P1
(
Rt <
b
a
)
= ω
(
1
t
)
(2.34)
as t → ∞, and recall that we assume that the revealing probabilities {pt}
∞
t=1 satisfy (2.4). As in
the proof of the upper bound, let Mt :=
∑t
i=1 pi and note that (2.4) implies that
Mt ≤ (1 + o (1)) (1− ε)
a+ b
b
κ⋆ (a, b) log t = (1 + o (1))
1− ε
fλ⋆ (a, b)
log t (2.35)
as t→∞, where recall the definition of fλ and λ⋆ from Section 2.2. We may also assume that
Mt ≥ δ log t (2.36)
for all t large enough, where δ ≡ δ (a, b) := 12 log(1+a/b) ; ifMt < δ log t then a simple argument shows
that (2.5) holds, which we defer to Appendix A.3. Define also τ (s) := min {t ≥ 1 : Mt ≥ s} , and
note that (2.35) and (2.36) imply that exp
(
(1 + o (1))
fλ⋆
1−εs
)
≤ τ (s) ≤ exp (s/δ) as s → ∞. In
particular τ (s) <∞ for every s <∞.
In order to show (2.34), we define three events that together imply that Rt < b/a and show
that the probability that they all occur, given θ = 1, is ω (1/t) as t → ∞. First, let t0 :=
τ
(
2a+ba−b log (a/b) + 2
)
and define
E0 :=
{
Rt0 ≤
(
b
a
)4}
. (2.37)
This initial event takes the L-likelihood ratio below b/a, and the events we now define ensure that
it stays below b/a. Let Jt := logRt denote the L-log-likelihood ratio and define the stopping time
T := min
{
s ≥ t0 : Js /∈
[
− log t, 2 log ba
]}
. Define now the events
E1 := {JT ≤ − log t} ,
E2 :=
{
min
s∈[t]
Js ≥ − log
3/4 t
}
.
Observe that E0, E1, and E2 together imply that Js ∈
[
− log3/4 t, 2 log ba
]
for all s ∈ [t0, t]. In
particular, they imply that Rt < b/a and so
P1
(
Rt <
b
a
)
≥ P1 (E0 ∩ E1 ∩ E2) . (2.38)
In what follows we show that the right hand side of the display above is ω (1/t) as t→∞.
We start with the initial event E0. Note that the first two individuals follow their private signal,
that is, Z1 = X1 and Z2 = X2, and hence if X1 = X2 = 2, then R2 = (b/a)
2. If Xi = 2 for all
i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , t0} then also Zi = 2 for all i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , t0}, regardless of whether the corresponding
players are Bayesians or revealers. Consequently, by (2.15) and (2.16), in this event the L-likelihood
ratio at time t0 is equal to
Rt0 =
(
b
a
)2 t0∏
i=3
1− aa+bpi
1− ba+bpi
. (2.39)
12
Now using
1− aa+bpi
1− ba+bpi
= 1−
a−b
a+bpi
1− ba+bpi
≤ 1−
a− b
a+ b
pi ≤ e
− a−b
a+b
pi ,
and also, by the definition of t0, the fact that
t0∑
i=3
pi ≥Mt0 − 2 ≥ 2
a+ b
a− b
log
a
b
,
we obtain from (2.39) that Rt0 ≤ (b/a)
4. Hence
P1 (E0) ≥ P1 (Xi = 2 ∀i ∈ [t0]) =
(
b
a+ b
)t0
.
Since t0 is a constant, we have that P1 (E0) is strictly bounded away from zero. Thus by (2.38) it
suffices to show that
P1 (E1 ∩ E2 | E0) = ω
(
1
t
)
(2.40)
as t→∞.
We now turn to estimating the probability of E1 and E2, given E0. Note that, given E0, the
L-log-likelihood ratio performs a random walk from time t0 until the stopping time T . Specifically,
for s ≥ t0 we can write
Js∧T = Jt0 +
s∧T∑
i=t0+1
ξi,
where the random variables {ξi}i>t0 are independent (of each other and everything else) with the
following distribution under P1:
P1
(
ξi = log
a
b
)
=
a
a+ b
pi,
P1
(
ξi = log
1− aa+bpi
1− ba+bpi
)
= 1−
a
a+ b
pi.
Note, in particular, that the random variables {ξi}i>t0 are uniformly bounded: log
b
a ≤ ξi ≤ log
a
b
for all i > t0. Furthermore, we have that
E1 [ξi] =
1 + ab
(
log ab − 1
)
1 + ab
pi +Θ
(
p2i
)
,
showing that the L-log-likelihood ratio has an upward drift in this regime. We perform a change
of measure to remove this drift: define P˜1 such that under P˜1 the random variables {ξi}i>t0 have
expectation zero. That is, define P˜1 such that for all i > t0 we have that
P˜1
(
ξi = log
a
b
)
= qi,
P˜1
(
ξi = log
1− aa+bpi
1− ba+bpi
)
= 1− qi,
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where qi is chosen such that E˜1 [ξi] = 0. A short computation gives that
qi =
log
1− b
a+b
pi
1− a
a+b
pi
log
(
a
b ·
1− b
a+b
pi
1− a
a+b
pi
) .
In the following we first estimate P˜1 (E1 ∩ E2 | E0) and then show (2.40) by understanding the Radon-
Nikodym derivative of P1 (· | E0) with respect to P˜1 (· | E0).
Under P˜1 we have that {Js∧T }s≥t0 is a martingale. By the optional stopping theorem we thus
have that
E˜1 [JT | E0] = E˜1 [Jt0 ] . (2.41)
By the definition of T we have that either JT > 2 log
b
a , in which case JT ∈ (2 log
b
a , log
b
a ], or
JT < − log t, in which case JT ∈ [− log t− log
a
b ,− log t). Hence we have that
E˜1 [JT | E0] = E˜1
[
JT1{JT<− log t}
∣∣ E0]+ E˜1 [JT1{JT>2 log(b/a)} ∣∣ E0]
≥ P˜1 (E1 | E0)×
(
− log t− log ab
)
+
(
1− P˜1 (E1 | E0)
)
× 2 log ba
≥ 2 log ba + P˜1 (E1 | E0)× (− log t) . (2.42)
From the definition of t0 we also have that
E˜1 [Jt0 ] ≤ 4 log
b
a
. (2.43)
Thus putting together (2.41), (2.42), and (2.43) we obtain that
P˜1 (E1 | E0) ≥
2 log ab
log t
. (2.44)
Applying Theorem 1.6 in [10] we have that
P˜1
(
min
s∈[t]
Js < − log
3/4 t
∣∣∣∣ E0) ≤ exp(−c log1/2 t)
for some constant c > 0. Together with (2.44) this shows that
P˜1 (E1 ∩ E2 | E0) ≥
log ab
log t
(2.45)
for all t large enough.
Since we want to show (2.40), what remains is to estimate the Radon-Nikodym derivative of
P1 (· | E0) with respect to P˜1 (· | E0) on the sigma-algebra Ft and on the event E1 ∩ E2. From the
definition of P˜1 we can write this down explicitly: we have that
dP1 (· | E0)
dP˜1 (· | E0)
∣∣∣∣∣
Ft
1{E1∩E2} =
t∏
i=t0+1

a
a+bpi
qi
1{ξi=log ab }
+
1− aa+bpi
1− qi
1{
ξi=log
1− a
a+b
pi
1− b
a+b
pi
}
1{E1∩E2}.
(2.46)
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We estimate each factor in this product. Specifically, we claim that there exists a constant C =
C (a, b) such that for every i ∈ {t0 + 1, . . . , t} the following holds:
a
a+bpi
qi
1{ξi=log ab }
+
1− aa+bpi
1− qi
1{
ξi=log
1− a
a+b
pi
1− b
a+b
pi
} ≥ exp ((1− λ⋆) ξi − fλ⋆pi − Cp2i ) . (2.47)
This inequality can be checked for both potential values of ξi by expanding the expressions in pi.
When ξi = log
1− a
a+b
pi
1− b
a+b
pi
, both sides of (2.47) are equal to 1+
a−b−a log a
b
(a+b) log a
b
pi+Θ
(
p2i
)
, so by choosing C
large enough, the quadratic term on the right hand side will be smaller than that on the left hand
side, and hence (2.47) holds in this case if C is large enough. When ξi = log
a
b , the left hand side
of (2.47) is equal to
a log a
b
a−b +
a log a
b
a−b
(
a−b
(a+b) log a
b
− 12
)
pi +Θ
(
p2i
)
, while the right hand side of (2.47)
is equal to
a log a
b
a−b −
a log a
b
a−b fλ⋆pi +Θ
(
p2i
)
. Thus the constant terms are equal and it can be checked
that the coefficient of the first order term is greater for the expression on the left hand side than
for the expression on the right hand side. Hence in this case (2.47) holds for all i large enough
regardless of the value of C, and if C is chosen large enough then it holds for all i ∈ {t0 + 1, . . . , t}.
After justifying (2.47), we can now turn back to estimating the quantity in (2.46) by multiply-
ing (2.47) over all i ∈ {t0 + 1, . . . , t}. Using the fact that Jt = Jt0 +
∑t
i=t0+1
ξi on the event E1∩E2,
and recalling also that Mt =
∑t
i=1 pi, we obtain that
dP1 (· | E0)
dP˜1 (· | E0)
∣∣∣∣∣
Ft
1{E1∩E2} ≥ exp
(
(1− λ⋆) (Jt − Jt0)− fλ⋆ (Mt −Mt0)− C
t∑
i=t0+1
p2i
)
1{E1∩E2}
≥ exp
(
(1− λ⋆) Jt − fλ⋆Mt − C
′
)
1{E1∩E2}, (2.48)
where C ′ := C
∑∞
i=1 p
2
i , and where in the second inequality we used that Jt0 < 0 (given E0)
and that
∑∞
i=1 p
2
i < ∞ due to the assumption (2.4). Now recall from (2.35) that fλ⋆Mt ≤
(1 + o (1)) (1− ε) log t as t → ∞. Recall also that on the event E2 we have that Jt ≥ − log
3/4 t.
Plugging these two estimates into the right hand side of (2.48) we obtain that
dP1 (· | E0)
dP˜1 (· | E0)
∣∣∣∣∣
Ft
1{E1∩E2} ≥ exp
(
− (1− λ⋆) log
3/4 t− C ′
)
× t−(1+o(1))(1−ε)1{E1∩E2}.
Consequently we obtain that
P1 (E1 ∩ E2 | E0) = E˜1
[
dP1 (· | E0)
dP˜1 (· | E0)
∣∣∣∣∣
Ft
1{E1∩E2}
∣∣∣∣∣ E0
]
≥ exp
(
− (1− λ⋆) log
3/4 t− C ′
)
× t−(1+o(1))(1−ε) × P˜1 (E1 ∩ E2 | E0)
≥
log ab
log t
× exp
(
− (1− λ⋆) log
3/4 t− C ′
)
× t−(1+o(1))(1−ε) = ω
(
1
t
)
,
where in the second inequality we used (2.45). This concludes the proof of (2.40) as desired.
3 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have shown that wrong information cascades can be broken by a small number
of individuals who disregard the actions of others and only follow their private signal, leading to
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asymptotic learning of the correct action. Moreover, we determined precisely the optimal asymp-
totic rate of decay of the error probability at a given time t.
This paper initiates a larger investigation into a broad family of problems that probe the fragility
of information cascades. We collect here some natural directions for future work.
• Alternative objectives. While asymptotic learning is the primary objective, once this is
achieved one can ask to minimize various notions of error. In this paper we focused on the
optimal asymptotic rate at which the error probability Et can go to zero, but other notions
of error are natural to consider as well. For instance, what is the expected number of errors
until time t and how can this be minimized? That is, what is
NEt ≡ NEt (a, b) := inf
{pi}
t
i=1
E
[
t∑
i=1
1{Zi 6=θ}
]
and what are the optimal revealing probabilities to achieve this? Theorem 1.1 implies that
NEt ≤ (1 + o (1)) κ⋆ log t. We conjecture that NEt = (1 + o (1)) c log t for some constant c
such that 0 < c < κ⋆.
• Alternative behavioral models. In this paper we considered a particular model: each
player is either a Bayesian or follows their private signal blindly. More generally, one can
consider any (causal) behavioral model that deviates from a pure Bayesian model. How do
various notions of error depend on the model specifics?
• More general setups. In this paper we considered the simplest possible setup: two possible
states of the world, a uniform prior over them, with each state corresponding to a distribution
over two possible private signals, which are in a natural bijection with the possible states of
the world. More generally one can ask the same questions with k possible states of the world,
a general prior over them, and each possible state of the world corresponding to a distribution
over ℓ possible private signals.
• Unknown parameters. We assumed that the players know the revealing probabilities
{pt}
∞
t=1. What if these are unknown, or if the players believe that they are {pt}
∞
t=1 when they
are actually {qt}
∞
t=1? Does asymptotic learning occur? If so, what is the optimal learning
rate?
We suspect that, for many of these problems, the results and techniques of this paper will be
useful in determining the correct order of magnitude for the relevant quantities. However, just like
in this paper, determining the precise constants will require a deeper understanding of the specific
problem of interest.
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A Auxiliary proofs
A.1 Proof of (2.29)
To prove (2.29), first note that the set At is either empty, in which case R
(1)
t = 1, or it can be
decomposed into blocks of consecutive integers. That is, there exist integers ℓ1, u1, ℓ2, u2, . . . , ℓk, uk
such that ℓi ≤ ui for every i ∈ [k], ui+1 < ℓi+1 for every i ∈ [k − 1], and At = ∪
k
i=1 {ℓi, ℓi+1, . . . , ui}.
We can then write
R
(1)
t =
k∏
i=1
ui∏
j=ℓi
Rj
Rj−1
=
k∏
i=1
Rui
Rℓi−1
. (A.1)
Since ℓi ∈ At we have that Rℓi−1 >
a
b for every i ∈ [k], and since ui+ 1 /∈ At we have that Rui ≤
a
b
for every i ∈ [k]; the condition Rt ≤
a
b is necessary to ensure that this latter fact holds for i = k as
well, that is, that Ruk ≤
a
b . Putting these together we obtain that each factor in (A.1) is at most 1,
showing that (2.29) holds.
A.2 Proof of (2.30)
We first rewrite the probability in question by taking logarithms:
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ t
−C1
)
= P1
(∑
i∈At
log
Ri
Ri−1
≤ −C1 log t
)
.
Given θ = 1 and i ∈ At, the random variable log
Ri
Ri−1
has the following distribution: it takes the
value log ba with probability
b
a+bpi and it takes the value log
1−
b
a+b pi
1−
a
a+b pi
with probability 1 − ba+bpi.
Define Yi :=
(
log RiRi−1
)
∧ 0. Thus, given θ = 1 and i ∈ At, the random variable Yi takes the value
log ba with probability
b
a+bpi and it takes the value 0 otherwise. We then have that
P1
(∑
i∈At
log
Ri
Ri−1
≤ −C1 log t
)
≤ P1
(∑
i∈At
Yi ≤ −C1 log t
)
= P1
(∑
i∈At
−Yi
log ab
≥
C1
log ab
log t
)
,
and notice that Y ′i := −Yi/ log
a
b is a Bernoulli random variable with expectation EY
′
i =
b
a+bpi. Let
{Bi}
∞
i=1 be independent Bernoulli random variables with expectation EBi =
b
a+bpi. We then have
the following bound:
P1
(∑
i∈At
−Yi
log ab
≥
C1
log ab
log t
)
≤ P
(
t∑
i=1
Bi ≥
C1
log ab
log t
)
.
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Note that E
∑t
i=1Bi =
a
a+b
∑t
i=1 pi = (1 + o (1))C
′ log t for some C ′ = C ′ (a, b). Hence by the
multiplicative Chernoff bound we obtain that
P
(
t∑
i=1
Bi ≥
C1
log ab
log t
)
≤ exp (−2 log t) = t−2
if C1 is large enough, concluding the proof.
A.3 Small revealing probabilities
Here we prove Lemma 2.1(b) in the case when Mt :=
∑t
i=1 pi < δ log t, where δ ≡ δ (a, b) :=
1
2 log(1+a/b) . Note that the first two individuals follow their private signal, that is, Z1 = X1 and
Z2 = X2. Hence if X1 = X2 = 2, then R2 = (b/a)
2, and we are in the regime where the MAP
estimator outputs 2. Thus if all the subsequent revealers have 2 as their private signal then the
MAP estimator continues to output 2. Let Revt := {i ∈ [t] : Ii = 1} denote the set of revealers
until time t. Recalling (2.11) we thus obtain the following lower bound:
P (MAP (Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt) 6= θ) ≥ P1 (X1 = X2 = 2, Xi = 2 ∀i ∈ Revt) . (A.2)
Note that |Revt| is independent of θ and that the Chernoff bound gives that P (|Revt| > 1.8δ log t) ≤
1/2. Thus we have that
P1 (X1 = X2 = 2, Xi = 2 ∀i ∈ Revt) ≥
1
2
P1 (X1 = X2 = 2, Xi = 2 ∀i ∈ Revt | |Revt| ≤ 1.8δ log t)
≥
1
2
(
b
a+ b
)2+1.8δ log t
=
b2
2 (a+ b)2
× t−0.9. (A.3)
Putting together (A.2) and (A.3) proves (2.5).
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